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TRAPS OF PLEBISCITARY DECISIONS 
The paper claims that spreading plebiscitary practices of political decision-making is not 
definitely an attribute of public engagement in policy-making processes, but more a sign 
of decline of representative democracy. Plebiscitary mechanisms of public participation, such as 
referendums, recalls and popular initiatives, instead of enhancing the democratic grade 
of political decision-making may transform into manipulative means of ensuring interests 
of elites in power or those, who are seeking for power. Involving illustrations based 
on the analysis of recent resonant precedents of plebiscitary decision-making, the article shows 
the most widespread traps of plebiscite public participation and their repercussions. 
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Introduction 
Public participation in political decision-making has always been one of top research issues 
of political science. As modern democratic regimes characterized by rather controversial features, i.e. 
erosion of representative forms democratic governing, developing the phenomenon of democratic 
conformism and simultaneously spreading plebiscitary practices of political decision-making, 
the mentioned issue is gaining special topicality. Indeed, as more and more often researchers come to 
the opinion that «representative democracy is breeding political disaffection»1 there is an evident tendency 
of intensifying the use of direct democracy practices of public decision-making even in the countries, where 
plebiscitary mechanisms are not regarded as conventional. Another tendency is significant narrowing 
the range of decisions, which are subject to public control. Delegating decision-making from the level 
of party-electoral competitiveness to the level of functional cooperation leads to neglecting interests of non-
organized groups. The latter fall out of the processes of political decision-making and lose their opportunity 
effectively defend of their interests. Besides, it often happens that pro-governing and opposition segments 
of the elite mostly do not admit political subjectivity of citizens outward of electoral context that causes 
public distrust and apathy. That is why the practices of direct public engagement into decision-making are 
recognized as an alternative and potentially more effective means of democratic governance. This idea is 
a conceptual core in spectrum of contemporary evaluations and theorizing of «direct», «plebiscitary» or 
«participatory» democracy. It is assumed the use of direct participation can compensate the disadvantages 
of representative democracy. Thus, plebiscitary mechanisms of decision-making such as referendums, 
public initiatives (primarily petitions) and recalls are getting more and more widespread. Citizens get 
immediate opportunity to influence policy-making, determine long-term priorities and at the same time 
becoming more political conscious. Plebiscites can enhance unification of society in the face of solving 
public issues and various participatory adjustmentі can ensure inclusiveness and public control. It goes 
about publicly important issues such the determining of the state course, guaranteeing national security, 
territory organization, improving governance and political regime, defense of human rights etc. Still, 
plebiscitary practices can act as manipulative means for getting public legitimization of the decisions taken 
by politicians in advance. There are numerous precedents when exercising plebiscitary mechanisms had 
rather ambiguous aftermath. The results of the most discussed recent years referendums, including the one 
as for Crimea’s joining Russia in 2014, the referendum on getting financial help of the creditors in Greece 
in 2015, the 2016-year’s referendums on Brexit, the one in the Netherlands as for ratification of the 
Agreement on Association between Ukraine and the EU, and one on the constitutional reform in Italy, were 
ambiguously assessed by citizens and experts, as each of these instances created risks for stability both 
domestic and international political systems. 
The issue of ambiguity of direct democracy has vast scientific basis. Though the most of literature is 
empiric and based on case-studies (Williams and Hume (2010), Aragonés and Sánchez-Pagès (2009), 
Fossedal (2005)), there are also works with outlining and conceptualization of plebiscitary practices 
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of democratic governance, their advantages and disadvantages (Merivaki (2016), Altman (2010), Qvortrup 
(2005)). The advantages of direct public participation are obvious from the point of view of citizens’ 
engagement into the political decision-making. Into respect of direct democracy, some scholars tend to 
stress educational functions of plebiscitary mechanisms, particularly value of citizens’ knowledge and their 
comprehension of political matters Crowther (2015)1. 
The present paper focuses on typical patterns of contextual data with which plebiscitary decision-
making can have destructive outcomes for the political system: instead of creating welfare for everyone, it 
causes the effect of disappointment and doubt in society and may have the risk of public conflicts. 
The analysis of factors presupposing the ambiguous character of potential effects of plebiscitary practices 
can upgrade understanding of their role in the democratic modes of governance and their impact on the 
given social environment. 
Conceptualization of direct participation in the framework of the theory of democracy 
In spite of the widespread turning to the ideas of direct democracy among politicians and researchers 
it is obvious that in modern states with great population and bigger territories in comparison with Ancient 
Greek polices the antique pattern of people power could not be implemented. Using the term of direct 
democracy in contemporary studies refers more to its complementarity towards representative democracy. 
Exploring whether direct democracy enhances or reduces the representative system of political 
participation, researchers outline the fact that implementing plebiscitary methods primarily connected with 
increase public distrust towards the mechanisms of representative democracy2. Albeit, the estimations 
of implementing practices of direct democracy in modern political systems are rather ambiguous: on the 
one hand, some plebiscitary mechanisms could be characterized «as strongly eroding crucial aspects 
of representative democracy»3 and on the other hand they can produce positive effect enforcing politicians 
to take into account the public opinion. 
The theory of plebiscitary democracy is connected with the conceptual heritage of Weber. He defined 
plebiscitary democracy as a special type of charismatic governing and presented it as a means 
of overcoming the tyranny of bureaucracy4. The main figure in this theory is a charismatic leader elected by 
the public direct voting. Yet, citizens are restricted in the right to fulfill control over bureaucracy from 
beneath. These functions are delegated to a charismatic leader who controls the bureaucratic activity from 
above. One of his main tasks is fighting bureaucracy to overcome oligarchy principle of governing. 
According to contemporary views on plebiscitary democracy, each citizen should have 
an opportunity at least to accept or reject laws influencing his/her life. For instance, Wiliams and Hume 
outline, «a referendum is held when the people cast a vote to accept or reject a question of law or policy, 
such as whether to amend a constitution or a piece of legislation»5. In this framework, plebiscitary 
democracy can be accompanied by authoritarian tendencies where the leader of the regime uses public 
acceptance as a primary means of legitimization of the political decisions. 
The concept of participatory democracy became widespread in the late ХХ – early ХХІ century. 
The participatory democracy is defined as «a process of collective decision-making that combines elements 
from both direct and representative democracy: Citizens have the power to decide on policy proposals and 
politicians assume the role of policy implementation»6. Proponents of participatory democracy suggest 
encouraging citizens’ activity through increasing their competence and involving them into the political 
decision-making. Thus, the theory of participatory democracy accounts for the combined model 
of governing when together with mechanisms of political representativeness one uses procedures of direct 
public participation in political decision-making. 
Whatever the pattern of involving citizens into policy-making could be called – direct, plebiscite or 
participatory democracy – the key category for assessing the efficiency of democratic mechanisms of public 
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participation is plebiscite format of decision-making in a broad sense looking into the etymology of Latin 
words «scitum» – decision and «plebs» – common people. Defining mechanisms of direct democracy «as 
publicly recognized institution wherein citizens decide or emit their opinion on issues not through 
legislative and executive elections but directly at the ballot box through universal and secret suffrage»1, 
Altman outlines the difference between «citizen-initiated and top-down mechanisms of direct democracy»2. 
While the most widespread citizen-initiated mechanisms of political decision-making include popular 
initiatives and recalls, referendums in the main are top-initiated. 
Referendums as political means: gainers and losers 
Referendums are widely recognized as an important means of people power and mostly studied 
through their legislative status and the scope of their impact on the course of events. There is variety 
definitions of referendums and attempts of their differentiation from plebiscites. In the scope of normative 
estimation, including the one in the international law, the difference between a referendum and plebiscite is 
stressed. Plebiscite is identified as a social survey with the aim of defining the future of a certain area 
through direct vote which country this area should belong to. Such a definition of plebiscite narrows the 
context of the issues, which can be placed for public vote to territorial issues only. Though taking into 
account the etymology of plebiscite this concept refers more not to contents but for procedural 
characteristics of decision-making exactly though direct citizens’ participation. 
In the framework of political studies, referendum is mainly associated with plebiscite as a 
confirmation of a political decision through people voting on legislative issues or the home and foreign 
affairs. As Marquis notes, «political scientists often use the term «referendum» for cases where government 
is obliged to act according to the expressed will of the majority of the electorate»3. Referendum is an 
important means of direct realizing legislative power, which ensures citizens’ right to express their views 
and take into account pluralist interests in the process of decision-making. The role of referendums in 
regulating public relationships is determined by their main social functions: realizing the right for public 
sovereignty, legitimization of authorities’ decisions, forming public opinion. Nevertheless, there are many 
hidden difficulties in holding a referendum. Such format of public engagement into political decision-
making is not that always realized for ensuring the principles of direct democracy. It is not a rare occasion 
that referendum as a means of public participation in decision-making provides the illusion of the 
participation itself. In reality, citizens’ opportunities to express their view on the issue are rather restricted: 
citizens are suggested to make their choice out of alternative answers to the questions, which were 
formulated by someone else. Practically they just have to legitimize the options, which have been chosen 
beforehand. Despite the fact that out of all plebiscitary mechanisms referendums are the most 
overwhelming from the point of view of involving citizens, they are not always aimed to enhance the level 
of democratic character of the decisions. Moreover, the results of implementing this procedure may have 
unpredicted or even destructive effect for both those who initiated the referendum and for those 
participating in it. Even Switzerland, which is the world known leader in implementing plebiscitary 
practices of decision-making, according to Fossedal has «disadvantages of the referendum system»4. As the 
advantages of referendums have already been listed above, I will focus on destructive results – traps – that 
can be caused by such plebiscitary mechanisms of decision-making. 
«Society-Split Тrap». The plebiscites’ results often split societies into almost equal camps 
of proponents and opponents of the decision placed on referendum. The topical example of it can be 
presented by the referendum of 2016 as for Britain leaving the EU. According to the referendum results, 
Brexit almost equally split the British society as for the future relations of Britain and the EU: 51,89% 
(leave) against 48,11% (remain)5. It is important that during six months after the referendum the opinion 
of both sides has not that changed, which is proved by the results of polls. According to ComRes’Survey, 
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47% British confirm their desire to leave the EU, shown at the referendum in June 2016, while 45% would 
prefer to remain in the EU1. 
Besides not convincing majority as for the issue of leaving the EU, Brexit showed other splits which 
can be characterized as accompanying effects. This is the estimation by the British of the question whether 
the UK should leave the SingleMarket: 36% consider that they should, while 41% of the respondents think 
that they should not.2 The other problem is aggravated by the outer factor – a not loyal position of European 
political elites as for the conditions of Brexit, including in the framework of further relations between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union. 
One more split trap among the referendum results as for leaving the EU for the United Kingdom was 
presented by the intention of the Scottish to hold a referendum for leaving the UK. It is worth reminding 
that the first Scottish referendum as for leaving Great Britain took place on September 18, 2014, when 55% 
of respondents answered that they would like to remain a part of the United Kingdom3. Yet, on June 24 at 
the referendum as for leaving the European Union 62% of the Scottish who voted expressed their desire to 
remain in the European Union4. The seriousness of the possibility of Scotland’s leaving the United 
Kingdom is proved by the clear statements of Scottish governors announced the preparation of legislative 
mechanisms to hold the second referendum on Scotland’s independence. Though Brexit is still in its design, 
it is obvious that a referendum, being a democratic mechanism for everyone, instead of uniting citizens for 
solving a certain problem can enhance the present or latent cleavages in a society and create new ones. 
Eventually, referendums can cause a risk of inner public tension and conflict, which may even result 
in deconstruction of state order. 
«Russian Roulette Trap» can be induced by the overestimation of political support. It happens 
when politicians not having assured support of representative governing body, turn to plebiscitary 
mechanisms in order to convert referendum as levers of influence. Though, initiating to hold a referendum 
one may get into a trap through incorrect estimation of support for a potentially expected result. Instead 
of the desired public legitimization of a suggested decision, in case of failure, one may be publicly 
delegitimized as political actor. Recent illustrations of such plebiscite trap are presented by resonant 
resignations of 2016 – David Cameron after the results of a referendum on Brexit and Маtteо Renzi after 
referendum on Constitution in Italy. 
David Cameron during his election campaign in 2015 made it one of his election provisions to 
promise the referendum as for UK leave the European Union. Positioning himself as the only guarantee 
of holding the referendum, he tried to reach not only inner party stability (which was crucially important for 
conservatives) but also to receive electoral dividends betting euro-skepticism of the British. The Prime 
Minister had to act not only as the initiator and organizer but also as an active participant of the campaign 
for the EU membership of Britain. Although his outer goal was to provide more lucrative conditions for 
Britain in the EU. Yet, inner political motives had priority. Despite Cameron’s active campaign in 2016 
aimed at support of the variant of staying in the EU the referendum results cost him the post of party leader 
and Prime Minister. 
Another example of «Russian Roulette Trap» is initiated in December 2016 by the Italian Prime 
Minister, Matteo Renzi referendum as for introducing changes into the Constitution of the country5. Among 
presupposed changes the main was to reduce of the influence of the Senate by curtailing the number 
of senators and limiting the scope of their influence on law-making process. The other key presupposed 
reform was centralization, with the aim of significant reducing the impact on regional solutions in the areas 
of infrastructure, transport, health, etc. Rome would have got the right to interfere into the decisions 
                                                     
1
 CNN – BREXIT: Six Months on Survey. Survey of 2,048 GB adults on Brexit, on behalf of CNN. 
<http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/cnn-brexit-six-months-on-survey> (2017, February, 8) 
2
 CNN – BREXIT: Six Months on Survey. Survey of 2,048 GB adults on Brexit, on behalf of CNN. 
<http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/cnn-brexit-six-months-on-survey> (2017, February, 8). 
3
 Scottish Independence Referendum Report on the referendum held on 18 September 2014. The Electoral 
Commission. December 2014. ELC/2014/02, 7 <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/ 
pdf_file/0010/179812/Scottish-independence-referendum-report.pdf> (2017, February, 08) 
4
 EU referendum results. Electoral Commission. <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-
subject/elections-and-referendums/upcoming-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-
information> (2017, February, 08). 
5
 La Riforma Constituzionale. Testo di legge costituzionale pubblicato sulla Gazzetta Uciale n°88 del 15 April 2016 
<http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/dossier/pdf/ac0500n.pdf> (2017, February, 8). 
ISSN 2336-5439  EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND LAW DISCOURSE • Volume 4 Issue 2 2017 
 
25 
of regions and other areas in the sake of the national interest. Centralization would have helped to clearly 
divide responsibility between the center and regions. The proposed changes could create a risk 
of authoritarian tendencies, since they were apparently focused on strengthening executive power. 
The given reforms tended to Weber’s pattern of plebiscitary democracy, when in the interest of political 
stability the head of state should count not on degrading parliamentary institutions, but directly on the will 
of the nation through plebiscites by which the proposed major government decisions are introduced. 
Although the draft constitutional reform was approved by parliament, Renzi decided to enlist the support 
of the population. To reinforce the importance of the effect of the referendum and perhaps with the desire to 
attract as many favorable votes as possible, he put at stake his position, announcing that in case of rejection 
of his proposals, he would resign. After all, Renzi failed to convince voters that the constitutional reform 
would significantly improve the political environment in Italy. In addition, radical political forces – 
Movimento 5 Stelle and NordicLeague urged to vote against, hoping for resignation of Prime Minister. 
On December 4, 2016 the Italians rejected constitutional reforms proposed by Prime Minister of the country 
Matteo Renzi. Like Cameron, Renzi initiated referendum to consolidate his power, but overestimated 
the level of support and failed: 59% of those who took part in the referendum voted against1. As a result, 
Renzi lost the post of Prime Minister. 
These two examples show how top-down initiated plebiscitary mechanism of decision-making, and 
actually playing games with voters, turned into a trap for the initiators that cost them their political career. 
It should be noted, that in both cases a significant role in influencing public opinion, and finally the results 
of referendums has been played by radical populist forces. 
«Populism Trap» is probably one of the most widespread and rather dangerous traps, which can be 
caused by plebiscitary mechanisms of decision-making. Referendums themselves may become an 
instrument of manipulative populism from the side of political forces trying to gain or to hold power. As 
a rule, in such cases political actors appeal to the public will, though using it purely in their own interests. 
In the EU the populist parties built their electoral campaigns on the critics of democracy deficit in the 
European Union, technocracy of European political elites and appeals to implementing mechanisms 
of citizens’ direct participation. 
Turning to the above-mentioned examples of the latest referendums in Europe, one should note that the 
plebiscite on the UK membership in the EU not only was to solve pre-election task for David Cameron but 
also served as an electoral platform for increasing popularity of the Party of independence of the United 
Kingdom (UKIP). The proof is presented by the results of the elections to the European Parliament in 2014. 
The Party received 27,5% of votes taking 24 MEP seats2 though in 2009 only 16,9% voted for it and the Party 
received 11 seats3 fewer in the EU representative body. The UKIP success lies in the fact that it appeals to 
such widespread in the British society ideas as leaving the European Union and restriction on immigration. 
In Italy, «where the abrogative referendum gives radical reformers considerable leverage, pressure 
from radical groups has been a primer factor in compelling reform of what had become a corrupt 
partitocrazia»4. The referendum as for constitutional changes has become a fail for pro-European left-
centered forces. Yet, it inspired their main opponent – the populist and Eurosceptic Movimento 5 Stelle, led 
by Beppe Grillo. The program of Movimento 5 Stelle is oriented on creating «anti-partocratic system which 
should contribute to direct participation of citizens in state governing on the basis of implementing digital 
forms of democracy»5. The political discourse of Euroscepticism is used as a pre-election technology 
on whose speculation radical parties are forming their brand, optimizing electoral support and get 
the opportunity to enter European, national and local representative bodies. While for Matteo Renzi 
the referendum as for constitutional changes had mainly the meaning of legitimization of the suggested 
reforms project, for Movimento 5 Stelle this plebiscite became a convenient platform for increasing their 
popularity, attracting voters through the critics of the current authorities. 
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Populists use Euroscepticism as an ideological platform and plebiscitary practices as an instrument 
of increasing their popularity at the national level. As an example one can regard the referendum which 
took place on April, 6, 2016 in the Netherlands as for confirming the Agreement on association between the 
European Union and Ukraine. The referendum had consultative and correcting character and was initiated 
by the group GeenPeil1 and supported by a series of radical-right parties and Eurosceptic political forces in 
the Netherlands. After intensive anti-Ukrainian campaign 61%2 of voters taking part in the referendum 
voted against confirming the Agreement. Though the referendum was not obliging, the government of the 
Netherlands could not but take it into account, which made the process of ratifying the Agreement more 
complicated. 
«Trap of Over-facilitating the Issue». A disadvantage of referendums, besides the opportunity 
of their prejudiced interpretation is the fact that they lead to not common but the only opinion that ignores 
other visions of tackling the problem, obliges single-valued choice in solving complicated and often 
arguable issues. The trap lies in the fact that political actors use referendums in an attempt to defend 
themselves from bearing responsibility for unpopular decisions, which can cost electoral support or even 
political career. Though placing on referendum in July 2015 the issue of providing credits to Greece was 
positioned as realization of direct democracy, obviously this mechanism can be valued as an attempt 
of government officials to avoid responsibility for the necessity of taking decisions as for approval or 
disapproval to receive outer financial support and hold rigid but crucial reforms. The formulation of the 
question placed on the referendum was the following: «Should the plan of agreement (the order of debt 
paying, new system of credits and the complex of economic measures) be accepted, which was submitted 
by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund? »3. The 
citizens were suggested two variants of answers: «YES» (Greek – ΝΑΙ) and «NO» (Greek – ΟΧΙ). It is 
obvious that the entanglement of the question demanded a more complex approach than just placing it into 
the borders of binary option of choice. Having held a national vote as for the issue, which directly refer to 
duties of state authorities and is the sphere of its competence, the Prime Minister of Greece Аlexis Tsipras 
shifted the responsibility for any variant of decision on the citizens and then on European institutions 
placing the latter into stalemate situation. Greek citizens in their majority (61,31%)4 voted against 
the package of fiscal changes. Nonetheless, despite Tsipras’s expectations the referendum results did not 
become an additional benefit and vice versa enhanced the creditors’ demands. Greece had to turn to even 
wider economic measures than those which were refuse by the population in the referendum: increasing and 
leveling taxation, reforms in pension system, increasing pension age, reducing subsidies, privatization 
of state actives for to recapitalization of banks and paying debts. The task of achieving economic and 
political stability in Greece failed. As a result, those who voted against the credit package and those who 
supported it found themselves in a trap of political manipulation from the side of referendum initiators and 
had to pay for any plebiscitary decision. The only political benefit which was received by the ruling Syriza 
after the referendum was the resignation of the main political opponent Antonis Samaras – the leader 
of opposition political force NewDemocracy. 
The veto placed by the Parliament of Australia on the bill about holding referendum on legalization 
of single-sex marriages proves that providing the plebiscitary mechanisms of decision-making is not always 
efficient. Some complex or sensitive public issues cannot be solved in a bipolar framework through choice 
between «Yes» and «No». The bill on national vote as for legalization of single-sex marriages was initiated 
by the leader of the Liberal Party of Australia Malcolm Turnbull during the elections in 2016. Having 
become the Prime Minister Turnbull sent the bill to the Parliament (Plebiscite (Same-Sex Marriage) Bill 
2016)5, but did not get support from the majority in the upper house. It is necessary to note that in Australia 
public discussion and debates as for the necessity of this referendum is rather ambiguous. There is the 
danger of radicalization in the intentions of certain public groups as for this issue during the agitation 
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campaign before the referendum. Besides, the effect of majority tyranny is possible: if national vote does 
not support this suggestion, single-sex couples will turn out to be delegitimized in the opinion of society. 
The given examples show how plebiscitary mechanisms of decision-making may have ambiguous 
effect for both initiators and participators of referendums. Plebiscites are often used as manipulative 
instruments to legitimize the confirmed decision or to shift responsibility for taking decisions as for 
complicated or sensitive issues on citizens. With authoritative and totalitarian leaders plebiscite may 
become the means of strengthening the system of personal power, elimination of political rivals and 
removal of opposition through solving the problems facing the regime without the participation of 
parliament, political parties and other democratic institutions. The worst pattern is implementing 
referendums with military-tactic aims. This scenario of direct democracy was used in March 2014 as for the 
status of Autonomous Republic of Crimea after the occupation of The Crimean peninsula by Russian 
troops. With breaking the procedure norms of preparation, law of Ukraine, international law and absence 
of observers from international organizations on March 16, 2014 in Crimea the referendum as for the status 
of peninsula was held. Because of impossibility to check the legitimacy of procedures and results, the 
referendum was not recognized by international organizations and many countries. It is symptomatic that 
even the position of the strong side did not enable the ruling forces of Russia (as it is clear that the scenario 
of Crimea annexation was prepared by the Kremlin) to avoid the trap of plebiscite for their decisions. 
Conflict with Ukraine, worsening of relations with many state leaders, exclusion from G8 and economic 
sanctions are the accompanying factors, which Russia faced after Crimea annexation, even on the condition 
of holding plebiscite on its territory. 
While referendums are usually top-down initiated, the most widespread plebiscitary mechanisms of 
decision-making initiated by citizens are public initiatives and recalls. It could seem that public initiatives 
and recalls being grass-root practices of decision-making should be more oriented on the ideals of direct 
democracy. Yet, these mechanisms also have their traps. 
«Participatory Placebo Trap» of popular initiatives and recalls 
Petitions and public initiatives that provide citizens the opportunity to put forward proposals on 
relevant issues are gaining in popularity. However, regulatory and procedural ensuring of such mechanisms 
is extremely important. It is on whether political forces are ready to provide citizens with public access to 
the management, depends whether they fall into a trap of participatory placebo. In general, this procedure 
provides that citizens have to collect a requisite number of signatures to submit a petition for qualify 
a statutory measure. As an illustration, one can give an example of the European Citizens’ Initiative. 
Introduction of mechanism of public participation laid down in the Lisbon Treaty1 – namely the 
European Citizens’ Initiative was a response to numerous criticisms about the democracy deficit in the EU. 
During first years of functioning of the European Citizens’ Initiative2 there have been a significant public 
activity and interest in the possibility to influence the European political agenda. It is also symptomatic that 
a number of proposed initiatives concerned practices of strengthening participatory democracy. However, 
with almost 60 cast of these initiatives only three were registered and taken into consideration by the 
European Commission, including 1 (initiative project of an adequate quality of drinking water3) has 
a chance to be issued as a bill. Among rejected initiatives there are some that reflect social demand on 
improving democratic procedures in the EU. Particularly, the initiative to introduce the legislative system of 
the EU legal framework for referendum regardless of constitutions of Member States with the aim to make 
plebiscitary decisions mandatory for every branch of government of the EU4. Another quite a radical 
initiative is one for immediate referendum on confidence in the competence of the European government, 
whereby existing European structures of governance need urgent replacement by new bodies formed 
                                                     
1
 The Treaty of Lisbon (adopted 13 December 2007, and entered into force on 1 December 2009). <http://europa.eu/ 
lisbon_treaty/full_text> (2017, February, 08) 
2
 European Citizens’ Initiative Official. <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome > (2017, February, 08). 
3
 Communication from the Commission on the European Citizens’ Initiative «Water and sanitation are a human right! 
Water is a public good, not a commodity!». Brussels, 19.3.2014 COM(2014) 177 final European Citizens’ Initiative 
Official <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-177-EN-F1-1.Pdf> (2017, February, 08). 
4
 The Supreme Legislative & Executive Power in the EU must be the EU Referendum as an expression of direct 
democracy (Date of refusal: 23/01/2014). European Citizens’ Initiative Official <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/details/1753 (2017, February, 08). 
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democratically1. These and other similar initiatives indicate a clear dissatisfaction of the citizens of the 
European Union not only with supranational democratic governance, but obviously erosion of traditional 
mechanisms of representation of their interests at European level. 
Recall is «a procedure whereby constituents have the power to remove a Member of Parliament or 
provincial legislature before his or her terms has expired»2. Plebiscitary recall is less common than 
referendums and popular initiatives, but still is an important procedure, which gives citizens the opportunity 
to influence the decision-makers. Recalls, in my opinion, present more a method of public control over 
authorities. One can indicate such positive features of recall as plebiscitary device, as it urges officials and 
representatives to be responsive for their constituents and can reduce political corruption. However, experts 
point out that recalls may threaten representative democracy and even more, «it would undermine the 
constitutional order of keeping the three branches of government separate»3. Recall may lead to a loss of 
independence for officials in the performance of their duties. Judiciary recall seems the most controversial, 
since the judiciary branch of power sometimes takes decisions against the will of the majority. Thus, recall 
can cause a «nondecision-making trap». Having certain fear as for recalls governors could avoid 
unpopular, but badly needed solutions, just to keep the voters loyal. Turning to the known precedent of 
an attempt of governor recall with Republican Governor Scott Walker in 2012, one should note that the 
political crisis in Wisconsin began after Walker sent to Congress state budget bill that would have cut 
benefits for members of trade unions and municipal services. Although Scott Walker still managed to carry 
the bill through Congress, and it came into force, initiated recall nearly cost him the post of a governor. It is 
important to note that since the recall is a targeted procedure it can be used as an instrument of political 
pressure or struggle against political opponents. Marivaki notices that «the heavy influx of out-of-state 
contributions during the 2011 Wisconsin gubernatorial recall and the 2013 recalls of two state senators 
indicate that outside interests played a major role determining the success of the recall efforts; as 
a consequence, the original intentions behind the attempts to recall these officials are questioned»4. Thus, 
despite efficient mobilizing and educative functions of grass-root plebiscitary practices, they are not 
deprived of the danger for those who decide to get into the trap of unpredictable consequences or effects 
of participatory placebo. 
Conclusions 
The presented review of ambiguous effects of implementing plebiscitary mechanisms of decision-
making is definitely not exhaustive. Every plebiscitary procedure, whether it is referendum of public 
initiative or recall, is an important element of citizens’ participation in political life. Still, as overall studies 
and case-studies prove, each of plebiscitary procedures may have disadvantages and cause poorly predicted 
effects. At the same time, a trap in which participants of any plebiscitary procedure may find themselves is 
conditional context in which it is held. Plebiscitary decisions are, as a rule, oriented on long-term results. 
But the conditions under which they are initiated and held is a key for understanding whether a concrete 
plebiscite is a real means of implementing the public will in favor of society or it is one of enormous 
manipulative instruments of receiving electoral loyalty by certain political forces. 
Plebiscitary precedents viewed in the article reveal that the mechanisms of political representation, 
particularly in Europe, are not sufficiently effective in terms of citizens. The mechanism of representation 
embodies an important relationship between the will of the citizens and the will of representatives in 
parliament, which, in its turn, should provide efficiency of representative democracy and legitimacy of 
taken decisions. However, changing of political space of large social groups in the last decade has serious 
consequences for relations between representative bodies and citizens. Partly it has happened due to the 
transformation of employment structure: exit from the labor market of metiers, in which the labor 
organizations arose that provided support for the political demands of the masses, led to marginalization 
                                                     
1
 To hold an immediate EU Referendum on public confidence in European Government’s (EG) competence (Date 
of refusal: 29/10/2013). European Citizens’ Initiative Official <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/details/1634> (2017, February, 08) 
2
 Marquis, P. (1993). Referendums in Canada: The effect of Populist Decision-Making on Representative Democracy. 
Background paper (Ottawa, Ont.), 6; BP-328E. Parliamentary Research Branch <http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-
R/LoPBdP/BP/bp328-e.htm > (2017, February, 08) 
3
 Merivaki, T. (2016). Initiative, recall and referendum. American Governance, 72. 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292762593_Initiative_Recall_and_Referendum> (2017, March, 11) 
4
 Merivaki, T. (2016). Initiative, recall and referendum. American Governance, 74. 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292762593_Initiative_Recall_and_Referendum> (2017, March, 11). 
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of the working class and the fragmentation of the population to other professional groups. Many of them 
did not manage to maintain an independent position in the political field, which significantly limits the 
articulation of collective goals. Becoming outsiders of global economy, employees see the root of their 
problems in migrants’ entering the labor market and the lack of protection of their interests at the side of the 
ruling elites. These categories are often subject to political manipulation and grace field of electoral support 
for populist parties. 
Plebiscitary mechanisms not always can guarantee sufficient expression of public will. The tendency 
of its spreading is a part of system problem of delegitimation of representative democracy, accompanied by 
decrease in efficiency of governments and loss of trust towards parliaments as transmission tools for public 
interests. It is obvious that success of plebiscitary procedures mainly depends on the level of trust 
of citizens towards the person who initiates plebiscite and the condition context. Even under favorable 
conditions, plebiscites may cause a trap and instead of the expected good for everyone, they can bring 
tension into society, risks of majority tyranny and harassment of those who supported the alternative 
variant, strengthening pre-centered authoritarian tendencies and spreading radical populism. It is important 
that in contrast to the decisions taken by representative or executive authorities, which can be corrected or 
canceled immediately, plebiscitary decisions cannot be ignored or just canceled at once. Despite potential 
risks, plebiscitary mechanisms of decision-making, along with ensuring direct expression of citizens’ will, 
still have strong enlightening effect for both its initiators and participants. 
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